The vital relationship between air and ground forces
THE question of the relationship between air and ground forces has always been a matter of controversy. From the days when the possibilities of the use of an air arm in warfare were first visualized, there has been argument as to whether an air force should be merely part of the army under direct army control, or whether it should be a separate concern with its own individual organization and authority and power to operate in its own way.
HOW THEY USED TO DO IT. In the early days of Army Co-Operation, before the intense development of wireless communication, Lysanders were used to pick up messages from troops in forward positions. The hook suspended from the fuselage of the Lysander shown here was used for this purpose and the “T” of white cloth spread out on the ground immediately below was so placed to show the direction of the wind.
The lessons of the Second World War have definitely proved that without air cover the success of any army operation is endangered. From that fact a clear understanding of the position of the air arm is now developing. The use the Germans made of air power when they marched into Poland, to Norway and then through the Low Countries into France first suggested the ultimate solution though in no case did they meet with stiff air opposition. More lessons were learned as a result of the war in Greece and the airborne invasion of Crete. Finally, they were put to test and clarified by practical experience in the Egypt and Libya campaigns which began with the defeat of Rommel at El Alamein and continued with his chase across fifteen hundred miles of African desert into Tunisia. Air power, the Royal Air Force, showed itself as the protective cover and advanced striking arm of the Army, its “fourth dimension”, working as an organization of its own but carrying out operations as an integral part of the high command controlling the whole campaign. It became the eyes and ears of the army, its long range artillery reaching where no guns could reach; its fighters were the army’s guerillas and its entire organization was the handmaid of the land force.
But the path to that state had not been easy. It had meant experiment and trial, tribulation and error. It had meant the scrapping of many pre-conceived ideas and the formation within the Royal Air Force of an entirely new command, Army Co-Operation Command, which was to spend two years of unsung and unpublicized effort in the intensive training of personnel in a new technique.
It had also meant the complete re-equipment with several new types of aircraft; the provision, for instance, of fast single-seat and well armoured fighters in place of the old and slow Lysanders which it was thought at the beginning of the war would do all that was necessary in the way of army reconnaissance. Light bombers and dive bombers had to be found and carriers for paratroops, as well as gliders and the aircraft to tow them.
MOBILE HEADQUARTERS. Mustangs have now replaced the Lysander above whose pilot has just returned from a reconnaissance flight and is reporting it to the air liaison officer. A despatch rider stands by and a machine gunner keeps a look-out for enemy aircraft. The mobile headquarters on the right is equipped with wireless by means of which it keeps in touch with aircraft while on patrol.
The first use of the air to give help and assistance to a land force saw the employment of spherical balloons and man lifting kites. Both were used successfully in the Boer War. Then airships, now obsolete, took the place of balloons. When the war of 1914 began, the first British aeroplanes to go to France were intended solely for reconnaissance for the army. Everybody knows that they were cumbersome, “bundles of wood and string”, to quote a pilot of those days. They did not carry bombs. Armament was also non-existent, except for the personal choice of some pilots and observers who took revolvers and even shot-guns up in the air with them. But they did a job. They gathered information from behind the enemy lines, even if they never flew very far. Height gave pilots and observers the power to see things that the army commanders and artillery dearly wanted to know about.
It was as though the vantage point that is the dream of every army general, an overlooking hill, had become fact whether he fought in the middle of a flat plain or not. Air power had become vital to the land force. But not just to one force. It was vital to both sides. Both tried to use it and both tried to prevent its use. There was only one thing to be done. An aircraft high in the sky could only be reached by another aircraft, one that was armed to shoot it down. Fighters came into existence and, as under the impetus of war the aeroplane developed rapidly and became a weight carrier, the bomber also arrived. The two arms of the R.A.F. as we knew them when this war began came into existence. The fighter, originally purely intended to see that an enemy machine did not reconnoitre or at any rate get back home with the results of its observation, became the means of securing domination of the skies. The bomber, originally intended as a reconnaissance machine and then as something capable of dropping a “shell” in the places just beyond range of the army’s guns, became an offensive weapon capable of interfering with enemy production deep in the interior. Each seemed to be a natural complement to the other and make a whole that ought to work independently of the land forces, be a separate service complete in itself, as distinct from the army as the navy and only co-operating as a separate service. This theory was accepted. The army lost its Royal Flying Corps and the navy its Royal Naval Air Service. They were joined together as the Royal Air Force. The army lost direct control of its eyes and ears.
INTERPRETATION STAFF AT WORK. An Army Co-Op. aircraft has returned from a photographic reconnaissance and the prints are now in the hands of the interpretation staff. With the aid of stereoscopic and other viewing devices they are able to gather valuable and highly accurate information regarding the disposition of enemy troops upon which the army commander will base his future plan of campaign.
When the Second World War began, that position, so far as the army and the R.A.F. was concerned, remained, though the Navy had managed to re-establish its Fleet Air Arm, and Coastal Command of the R.A.F. had become a close worker with the Admiralty. The R.A.F. had fighters and bombers which were as modem as the times, but it had few aircraft specially designed for army reconnaissance work and little conception of what that reconnaissance would mean. Both the army and the R.A.F. had also been severely handicapped by pre-war disarmament efforts, one of the effects of which had been for the R.A.F. to conserve what resources it had for R.A.F. purposes pure and simple, the development of its fighters and bombers.
Army Reconnaissance
The aircraft that were available for army reconnaissance were of a type that needed certain conditions in order to operate successfully. They had to have freedom of leisurely movement in the air. A low flying plane is hard to hit. They must be protected by their own fighters or be left entirely alone by the enemy. Neither was possible. The first because the R.A.F. had not got enough fighters and the second for the reason that the enemy was not charitably minded.
Speed of the fighter type of aircraft was not considered necessary for army reconnaissance work and the machines used were designed to ensure that the pilot had a good view. They were Lysanders and, for longer range work deep into enemy territory, Blenheims. Aircraft that could act as the army’s primary attacking force, light bombers and fighter bombers were not available. Nor was there a sufficiency of fighters. It was not even expected that the Germans would decide to use aircraft in that particular way.
But the Germans had also designed a slow aircraft specially for army reconnaissance work and had produced the Henschel 126, a machine almost identical with the British Lysander. Then came the Battle of France to emphasize the tactics the Germans had used in Poland, Norway and the Low Countries and show that, given air superiority, the dive bomber could be a potent weapon. The Battle of France ended with the withdrawal of the British troops, but a great and important new principle of warfare had been established. It had been made clear that the success or failure of an army depended on the amount of air cover it could command. It was realized that, with fighter cover, land forces had freedom of action, reconnaissance planes could work unmolested and the dive bomber did have a use.
BRIEFING MUSTANG PILOTS The pilots seen here are just off on a reconnaissance. The air intelligence liaison officer explains the purpose of the flight, the area to be reconnoitred, and what is to be looked for.
In France the Germans had many times the number of aircraft at the disposal of the British. The German staff was able, consequently to plan every phase of its swift advance with the knowledge that its own troops would be practically immune from air attack and that the Luftwaffe would be delivering concentrated attacks behind the British lines on communications, reserves and dumps. The Germans were able to plan their bombing attacks in the sure knowledge that their tanks and troops would reach certain positions at specified times. They worked out a detailed time-table which took into account their air move-movements as well as their land movements. They subordinated everything to this precise co-operation with a result that is now history. They showed the world how air and land forces could, and must, work together, and Britain took heed. Britain formed Army Co-Operation Command within the R.A.F. to put into effect the lessons learned and give the land forces back their air arm. The idea of the relationship between air and land forces had gone almost full circle. The experience of Libya showed later that the Germans can be beaten at their own game — and beaten hard.
The first step taken by Army Co-operation Command was to discard the Lysander and re-arm with fast, well-armoured aircraft. The American Tomahawk was used, then the Kittyhawk and later on the powerful Mustang. In addition to these faster types of planes the Taylorcraft Auster is also used. Paratroops came into existence. Airborne regiments using gliders were formed. Light bombers suitable for the peculiar needs of the army were produced and pilots were trained in their special use. Fighter bombers were developed for army purposes. Regular army officers were seconded to the R.A.F. to work operationally in the Command. R.A.F. men were trained in that mass of knowledge which is vital to the army, since they would be required to supply military information. Pilots had to learn to identify the mark of a German tank, recognize the differences in the types of guns moving along a road and know how to draw the correct inference from a column of motor cyclists with side cars as against a string of motor cyclists. It was not enough that an Army Co-operation pilot could fly. He had to have a thorough knowledge of the German army, its equipment and how it was transported, and of its armoured formations. The pilot had to be something of a military encyclopaedia as well as a highly skilled airman.
The Liaison Section
For this reason there are no R.A.F. Intelligence Officers on the staff of the Command. The intelligence brought back is not of an Air Force nature. It is military information. Each Army Cooperation squadron accordingly works with a small liaison section of three army officers who have been specially trained. They are picked men. It is their duty to brief pilots, advise them on their tasks and extract every scrap of military information when they return.
Each of these sections has its own travelling photographic tender where the results of each sortie are processed. To the army liaison officer falls the task of making the first interpretation of the pictures brought back. This interpretation, along with the verbal report of the pilot, is telephoned or wirelessed or sent by dispatch rider to headquarters.
Army Co-operation pilots pass through the usual flying schools of the R.A.F. But to this is added a course in the art of military manoeuvre. This, in time, leads them to the specialized training of Army Co-operation headquarters under which also come special training units to instruct airborne troops, parachute organizations.
Much has happened within the Command, apart from the training of pilots to support the army in the Middle East. Pilots have been taught how to give support over here, on the Continent or wherever else they may be needed. For months they trained on their Tomahawks and then on their Mustangs.
The change over from the old Lysander to the fast single seater fighter was much greater than it looks on paper. It was a revolutionary change that compelled the pilot to do the work previously done by a pilot and observer. It compelled one man to do the thinking of two in a few seconds instead of in minutes.
The British pilots got over the difficulty with remarkable speed. The visual and photographic reconnaissance carried out previously at a leisurely rate and at a fair height had to be done at hundreds of miles an hour at tree-top height. The pilots had to keep one eye on the ground, one in front of them, a third behind them, a fourth above, a fifth to the right and a sixth to the left. Careful training and the clever placing of a mirror gave them visual powers equal to the imaginary six eyed man. In addition, the pilot had to navigate his machine correctly, read his maps and make pencil notes of everything of importance he saw below.
While undergoing this training the pilots mix with army personnel to gain as much experience as possible of army methods. They take part in numerous exercises and in due course carry out miniature sweeps across the Channel to wreck Dutch, Belgian and French railways and canals. At Dieppe, with conspicuous success, they played the part they had trained for — that of army supporters.
The reconnaissance machine, is however only one side of the work of Army Co-op. Light bombers, of which there are several squadrons, are piloted by crews specially trained in the art of giving troops close support. Apart from machine gunning and bombing advanced elements of the enemy, a task also carried out by Hurricane bombers, they have another job of primary importance. The laying of smoke screens or the dropping of smoke bombs to hide from the enemy the activity of our troops on the ground, if not done expertly, might cause the loss of a battle. The smoke is also a useful agent in preventing the enemy from seeing the descent of paratroops.
MUSTANGS OF ARMY CO-OPERATION COMMAND IN FLIGHT. These fast Mustangs are the aircraft which do the work of army reconnaissance behind the enemy lines. Apart from their high speed, they often fly so low to take photographs that they return to their base with evidence that the tops of trees or telegraph wires have been flown through. Fitted with special secret cameras, detailed photographs of small areas can be taken at astonishing speeds. Frequently the pilot of a Mustang will release the shutter of his camera at not more than 50 feet above the ground while travelling at well over 300 miles an hour.
All glider pilots were at one time also trained by Army Co-operation, and special aerodromes in the Command are set aside for making paratroops air-conscious. The Russians were the first to develop the technique of putting into action airborne troops, but the Germans followed their lead rapidly and there is no doubt that the use of parachutists and men in troop carrying aircraft played a large part in the capture and subsequent capitulation of Holland in the spring of 1940, and was largely responsible for similar events in Crete a year later. Naturally such modern developments have been by no means neglected by the Army and the R.A.F. — witness the many successful landings of British paratroops in Italy and elsewhere. Probably the most interesting aspect of this system is that of the employment of parachutists, and discussion on the subject with regard to both Britain’s and Germany’s methods has been considerable.
The parachutist is a soldier by rights and merely uses a formerly unusual means of descent in order to pounce upon his enemy from unexpected directions. All necessary arms, ammunition, explosives for sabotage, food and other supplies, even bicycles, also parachute borne, accompany him on his descent.
His training is not as difficult or alarming as it sounds; in fact the wind is tempered to the shorn lamb to a remarkable degree. Without equipment he is invited to jump from comparatively low heights increasing to something like ten feet on to a gymnasium mat. Partly supported by a suitable tackle of ropes, pulleys and counterweights he is then gradually acclimatized to some of the sensations of a real parachute descent inside a hangar. Concurrent with these activities he is subjected to a course of intensive physical training which attunes him to an exceptional degree of physical fitness and when the time comes for him to do his first real descent from an aircraft, he finds that there is if anything less cause for hesitation than when high diving for the first time at a swimming pool.
A disadvantage of parachutist descents is that arrival is roughly equivalent to that following a jump off a ten-foot wall. Added to that is lateral speed due to the wind. The process is apt to be painful, and the parachutist is not always immediately possessed of the enthusiasm necessary in a soldier about to undertake a hazardous operation. Another point is that before he “takes silk”, as he calls it, he may have spent many cramped hours in an aeroplane under conditions of great cold and in darkness.
A typical aeroplane used by the R.A.F. to transport parachutists is the Armstrong-Whitworth Whitley. These twin-engined long range heavy bombers, suitably adapted for the purpose, are shown in the illustration at the foot of this page. Perhaps more mundane — if the activity in which aircraft takes part can be so termed — is the method of transporting personnel in multi-engined aircraft and disembarking them in strategic positions actually on the ground.
Perhaps of all the methods of transporting troops by air that in which towed gliders are employed is most interesting. The gliders are towed one behind the other in “trains”, as it were, each glider containing six or more fully equipped infantrymen who, unlike parachutists, at first busily occupied with preparatory measures, are already in parties under N.C.O.s ready to begin instant hostilities with marshalled equipment on landing.
After being disconnected from their parent craft gliders can reach their objective in complete silence, their gliding range, moreover, may be considerable, and they are released from a great height. Another distinct advantage possessed by the glider is that it can land on its skid with an extremely short run. It can thus avoid either real or artificial obstacles in fields such as stooks, trenches, poles, wires, and so on.
How many troops the largest practicable glider can carry is still a matter of conjecture; suffice it to say that a considerable force could be, and has been, landed by an enemy without the use of an inordinate number of towing aircraft. Should the latter themselves be troop carriers, their effective capacity could be enormously increased, depending upon the number and size of their satellites, or if not troop carriers they could, as a sideline, carry a useful load of bombs or a useful load of stores and equipment which they could drop by parachute to the troops below.
It is too early to speak with any authority upon the question of transporting light tanks, ready for action, between the undercarriage legs of giant aeroplanes, but it is known that both the Russians and the Germans have carried out experiments in this direction.
It will be seen from what has been written that the duties of an air force in co-operation with or support of an army are many. With the development of modern warfare these will tend to increase rather than diminish. It is comforting to know, however, that no matter how advanced the prosecution of modern warfare may become, Britain’s Royal Air Force is keeping abreast of the times in technical development, and is ready with considerable alacrity to meet all the varied requirements of Britain’s Army whatever they may be and in any circumstances.
PARACHUTE TROOPS BALE OUT. Parachute troops leaving Armstrong-Whitworth Whitleys during a demonstration in England. The parachutes open immediately the men leave the plane, making very low altitude jumps possible, thus reducing the time of being unable to reply to Possible sniping.
THE question of the relationship between air and ground forces has always been a matter of controversy. From the days when the possibilities of the use of an air arm in warfare were first visualized, there has been argument as to whether an air force should be merely part of the army under direct army control, or whether it should be a separate concern with its own individual organization and authority and power to operate in its own way.
